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Keeping the Bubble Alive! 
The Effects of Urban Renewal and Demolition 
Subsidies in the East German Housing Market 
Abstract 
German urban renewal programs are favoring the cities in the Eastern part since the re-
unification in 1990. This was accompanied additionally by attractive tax incentives, de-
signed as an accelerated declining balance method of depreciation for housing invest-
ments during the 1990s. The accumulated needs for comfortable housing after 40 years 
of a disastrous housing policy of the GDR era were generally accepted as justification 
for the subvention policy. But various subsidies and tax incentives caused a construction 
boom, false allocations, and a price bubble in Eastern Germany. After recognizing that 
the expansion of housing supply was not in line with the demographic development and 
that high vacancy rates were jeopardizing housing companies and their financial back-
ers, policy changed in 2001. Up to now, the government provides demolition grants to 
reduce the vast oversupply. By means of a real option approach, it is explained how dif-
ferent available forms of subsidies and economic incentives for landlords lift real estate 
values. The option value representing growth expectations and opportunities is calcu-
lated as an observable market value less an estimated fundamental value. Empirical re-
sults disclose higher option premiums for cities in Eastern Germany and a strong corre-
lation of the option premium with urban renewal spending.  
 
Keywords: Real Option, Housing Market, East Germany, Urban Renewal Subsidies 
JEL classification: R0, H2  
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Keeping the Bubble Alive! 
The Effects of Urban Renewal and Demolition 
Subsidies in the East German Housing Market 
Zusammenfassung 
Seit der Wiedervereinigung werden die Städte in Ostdeutschland bei den Programmen 
der Wohnungsbau- und Städtebauförderung finanziell begünstigt. In den 1990er Jahre 
wurde dies durch degressive Abschreibungsmöglichkeiten für Immobilieninvestitionen 
ergänzt. Die Instrumente der großzügigen Wohnungsbauförderung sind vor dem Hinter-
grund der aufgestauten Bedürfnisse der Bevölkerung nach ausreichenden und komfor-
tableren Wohnungen, die von der DDR-Wohnungspolitik nicht erfüllt werden konnten, 
zu verstehen. Der resultierende Bauboom führte jedoch zu Fehlallokationen und ließ ei-
ne Immobilienblase in Ostdeutschland entstehen. Nachdem dies erkannt worden war, 
änderte sich die Politik und gewährte ab 2001 mit dem Programm „Stadtumbau Ost“ 
Abrissprämien, um das Überangebot an Wohnraum zu beseitigen. Die Motivation und 
die Folgen dieser Subventionspolitik für Wohnungseigentümer, Investoren und das Im-
mobilienpreisniveau  werden  mit  einem  Realoptionsansatz  untersucht.  Es  wird analy-
siert, wie die verschiedenen Subventionsformen Immobilienwerte erhöhen, und anhand 
von Fundamental- und Optionswerten gezeigt, dass bis heute eine Preisblase auf dem 
ostdeutschen Wohnungsmarkt existiert. 
 
Schlüsselwörter: Realoption, Wohnungsmarkt, Ostdeutschland, Stadtumbau 
JEL-Klassifikation: H2, R0  
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Keeping the Bubble Alive! 
The Effects of Urban Renewal and Demolition Subsi-
dies in the East German Housing Market 
Introduction 
Due  to  the  demographic  shrinking  process  in  East  Germany,  the  government  gives 
grants to house owners for demolishing their vacant flats and therewith reducing the 
housing over plus. The demolition grant is about 60 Euro per square metre (sqm) of re-
duced living space. In combination with a partial bail out regulated by a special law for 
old inherited depths is given a big incentive for demolition (GdW 2005 p. 150). Be-
tween 2002 and 2007 more than 193,000 flats have been demolished, mostly in big 
blocks of flats that were build in the socialist era of the GDR (Liebmann et al. 2007 
pp. 23 et seq.) The owners of these so called “Plattenbau” flats are mostly big local pub-
lic housing companies or cooperative societies.  
This policy meets a market which performance and vacancy rates disappointed the ex-
pectations of many investors. Modernization of flats and the number of new buildings 
has broken down and remains on a very low level. This holds also for the number of 
housing transactions, apart from some opportunistic portfolio deals of foreign investors. 
Obviously the landlords that invested a lot of money now try to minimize their equity 
losses and can react on lower revenues und vacancy risks with or without subsidies. 
This paper examines with a real options approach how subsidies and economic incen-
tives lift up property values and influence the investors´ decisions because the advan-
tages of different options for action may be distorted by subvention. The considerations 
made in this paper refer predominantly to renters and landlords. Proprietors who live in 
their own condominium or single house are not addressed. 
Section 2 gives a brief outline about the historical background and the later outcomes of 
the various market interventions and subsidies given to the East German housing mar-
ket. Section 3 outlines the real option characteristics of a property and concretizes se-
lected options. Section 4 applies the real option concept to show theoretically how urban 
renewal subsidies can modify the value of a property. Section 5 presents a method to as-
sess the valuation of property real options. Section 6 presents the empirical results and 
Section 7 concludes with a discussion about implications for the urban renewal policy.  
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1  The Genesis of a Bubble 
Instead of the West German real estate market with a seamless tradition of a rather free 
market with different moderate housing policy instruments the East German housing 
market was state controlled until the reunification in 1990. Reports on the economic and 
physical structure revealed a disastrous state of the historic housing stock as well as a 
preceding dilapidation in the big blocks of panel flats constructed between 1970 and 
1990. Many historic buildings were uninhabitable and at risk to collapse. The stately 
fixed rent level of about 1 Mark per sqm was far away to break even. As a consequence 
maintenance and reinvestment were neglected. The political and economic breakdown 
of the GDR Regime is partially attributed to the inefficient housing policy (Jenkis 1996 
pp. 673 et sqq.). In the first years after the turn around unanswered questions of owner-
ship caused problems. Longsome modalities and judicial procedures of restitution were 
obstacles for urban development (Osenberg and Waltersbacher 1997). The challenge of 
transformation to the West German system was a balancing act between economic, so-
cial, legal and structural aspects for the policy, landlords, town planning and other mar-
ket actors. One can divide this process roughly in two phases of boom and consolida-
tion. 
1.1  Boom and Expansion in the 1990s 
To get out of the unbearable situation, a package of measures was set up to improve the 
East German housing stock very fast und comprehensively. The adaption of the low rent 
levels of the existing housing stock to a free competitive rent system was regulated until 
1998 by a transformation law with a stepwise rent increase (Jenkis 1996, pp. 713 et 
seq.). Urban renewal programs existed for city centres, local public and cooperative 
housing companies and historical buildings. The investment in housing and commercial 
real estate was boosted not least by an enormous tax incentive provided by the assist 
area law. Between 1992 and 1998 it was possible to write of 50 percent of a real estate 
investment within the first 10 years. The intended effect was an enormous stream of 
capital from west to East Germany, because a many better of West Germans used this 
way to lower their tax rate. This situation made it easy to issue closed end investment 
companies, which were often designed just for exploiting the tax effect. 
As a result of the tax induced demand for housing investment property prices in East 
German cities were increasing and uncoupled from the development in West Germany 
(Reichsthaler 2006). This and the continuously increasing rent level during the 1990s 
stimulated a euphoric sentiment on the real estate market. Hence, investors bought more 
and more inferior properties in bad locations or just superficially renovated blocks of 
flats without having a look at the property and its surroundings in reality.  
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More indicators for an upcoming housing market bubble offer statistics. Regarding the 
development of fundamental economic figures like the purchasing power or the unem-
ployment rate in East Germany is likely that the living conditions and local amenities 
are not in line with the nominal East German rents, which have reached nearly West 
German level (Weiß 2008a). Between 1995 and 2000 renovation of flats and new con-
struction of single family homes enlarged the housing stock by 8.3% while population 
drops by 2.1% in the same time. 
Vacancy rate increased very quickly and many investors became disappointed with the 
performance of their portfolio and the loss of equity. The dramatic situation of 1 Million 
vacant flats in 1998 was disclosed in a report on the East German housing market. How-
ever, approximately 500 000 flats were not offered in the market due to the uninhabit-
able conditions or temporary closedown by the landlords. (Pfeiffer et al. 2000, p. 20). 
Not only private landlords suffered by the high vacancy rates. Local public and coopera-
tive Housing companies which are controlling about 50% of the rented flats in East 
Germany were affected by a great extend too. They had renovated their housing stock 
with a high leverage and into the bargain they were burdened with inherited credits. As 
legal successors of the GDR housing companies their depths by the GDR state bank 
were transferred to the German Federal Bank. Many of the housing companies were 
bearing losses due to operating costs of vacant flats and were at the edge to insolvency a 
couple of years after the new start-up in the early 1990s. 
1.2  Consolidation since 2001 
But the vacancy was not alone an urbanistic issue or a business problem of the housing 
companies.  Banks  were  strongly  engaged  in  financing  the  East  German  real  estate 
boom. Alone the state owned bank KfW that handed out 40 Billion Euros (Reich 2000). 
The big amount of nonperforming loans has led to some restructuring and mergers be-
tween affected banks and attracted private equity firms like Lone Star and Oaktree inc. 
to invest in the bad dept (Businessweek 2005). While most private banks could escape 
the crisis in this way it is assumed that the federal state had a bigger problem. A bank-
ruptcy of the housing companies would not only bring losses to the creditor KfW. It 
could rather cause damage to the financial and economic stability of the cities as owners 
and bailers of the housing companies. Therefore federal government has strong incen-
tives to keep the bubble alive and to install aid for a very soft landing. In other words 
government’s stabilization objective means maximizing aggregate rents and landlords’ 
incomes  while  accepting  possible  overall  welfare  losses  caused  by  price  distortions 
(Dascher 2006).  
An expert commission recommended the demolition of 300,000 to 400,000 flats within 
10 years to stabilize the housing market (Pfeiffer et al. 2000). To prevent the crash gov-
ernment created instruments like the demolition subsidy of the urban renewal program 
with the euphemistic name “city redesign” (Stadtumbau) an investment grant for inner  
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city areas and aids for the adaption of supply infrastructure. Additionally existing urban 
renewal programs were extended. Up to now the amount of urban renewal spending in 
East Germany is 186 Euro per capita between 2000 and 2005. This is more than seven 
times higher than in the west, where urban renewal spending reaches only 25.2 Euro per 
capita in the same term (INKAR 2008). 
About 220,000 flats have been demolished in the programs first run since 2001. An in-
terim evaluation of the program shows that vacancy rates are slightly declining espe-
cially in the areas of socialist panel flats (Liebmann et al. 2007, pp. 24 et seq.). But what 
happens to the prices and rents on the housing market? The presumption that the bubble, 
originated in the 1990s, still exists is shown with the analysis of the basic values and op-
tion values which can be calculated with a real option approach.  
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2  Real Options in a Property Context 
An Option gives the owner a well defined right. In the case of financial options it is 
mostly the right to buy or to sell an amount of stocks or a currency at a preassigned price 
within or at the end of a fixed period. According to the option pricing theory the value 
option depends of the market price of the underlying, its volatility and the time to expi-
ration. The concept of real options goes back to Myers (1977) and transfers the theory 
and methods of securitized financial options to the real economy. As a valuation method 
for investment projects under uncertainty it has some advantage compared to the clas-
sical discounted cash flow method. The concept of real options and circumscribes the 
huge number of different options and action possibilities in connection with investment 
projects. For example, an investment could be extended if the return is favorable or be 
abandoned if it generates losses. Another common real option is the possibility to switch 
the outputs or inputs of a production plant. Real estate property contains a bundle of de-
velopment alternatives too.  
Before I present the model to characterize the option value, the next section gives a 
short review of literature that employs the concept of real options to land and property 
markets.  
2.1  Property Real Options in Economic Literature 
Different questions in real estate economics have recently been addressed by real option 
techniques. Titman (1985) provides a prominent application that adapts the classical 
methods and formulas to valuate options and derivatives that were developed by Black 
and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973). Assuming risk neutral investors Titman showed 
that, the expected future value of vacant urban land is increasing with higher uncertainty 
and that it may be advantageous to wait for additional information before deciding upon 
the size and other details of an irreversible building project. This work explains the exis-
tence of free properties in expensive and densely developed areas and shows that specu-
lative behaviour of the landlords is rational. Also Clarke and Reed (1987) assess the op-
tion value of vacant land. Other studies address furthermore the question of an optimal 
date of abandonment (Williams 1991). 
Quigg (1993), Yamazaki (2001) as well as Kanoh and Murase (1999) performed empiric 
studies to value the option that is incorporated in vacant land. 
The earlier theoretic studies refer an option value only to undeveloped land. Since build-
ings are durable but replace capital Capozza and Li (1994) model land-redevelopment 
decisions with the possibility to adjust the capacity or to change the development type 
e.g. residential or commercial. Downing and Wallace (2001) test whether improvement 
investments of home owners are in line with real option theory. Another strand of stu-
dies focus on game theoretic models that allow discussing the option exercise strategies  
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in  a  competitive  environment  (Grenadier  1996,  2000;  Cortelezzi  and  Giannnoccolo 
2006; Wang and Zhou 2000, 2006). In multiplayer games the possibility of pre-emption 
by competitors changes the exercising behaviour of the investors (Grenadier 2002). 
2.2  A simple Property Real Option Model 
Basically urban land gives the owner the right to build according to the local zoning 
laws. This means, that she has the opportunity to build, but she does not have to build. 
This right is durable and tradable because it is generally not limited to a person nor it 
has an expiry date. If the property is built, there is the possibility to renovate, upgrade in 
quality or size, demolition and redevelopment or to sell the property. These possibilities 
are also considered as real options for the owner. The price of the property should refer 
to the capitalized revenues (e.g. rents) and the value of the bundle of options. 
In the real option model presented by Sotelo (2001) the value of a property consists of 
different value elements. Similar to the DCF method the earning rate (E) is calculated as 
the capitalized revenues of a planned building. This net present value is assumed as a 
secure profit. Fix construction costs (C) can be seen as the execution price to realize this 
profit. The difference between E and C is the intrinsic value (I) of the real option.  
E   C = I 
The intrinsic value I can also be calculated as the net present value of a secure project. If 
I > 0 the real option is in the money. As an example one could imagine a planned build-
ing project with existing rent contracts. But the intrinsic value would not be an accepta-
ble price for the owner to sell the property. Usually the sales value (V) of the property is 
higher than guaranteed by the intrinsic value, due to the volatility of revenues and an 
expected higher profit. Some riskier projects, for example a bigger apartment house or 
an office building with higher revenues, are possible instead of the planned safe building 
project. It may be attractive to wait with the development of the property and to invest 
later in a more profitable building (Titman 1985).  
The chance for higher revenues with another building has a value for the owner and is 
connected with the property not with the planned building. This is the option value (O) 
of the property and refers to the difference between sales value and intrinsic value.  
O = V  I 
This premium is very important in the concept of real options. The option value of a real 
estate property contains all unsecure expectations for a higher demand in the future. The 
option to invest later and these expectations make waiting for higher revenues and spe-
culative behavior rational.  
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Figure 1: 
Value Elements of the Property as a Real Option 
  
Source:  Author. 
Due to the indelibility of land the options related to a real estate property have no tem-
poral limitation. For that reason a property will have some value all the time, provided 
that there is no heavy contamination or other severe adversity. But the option value of a 
property can change. A big part of the premium will be destroyed with the construction 
of a building. Lower land prices for built properties than for free properties supports this 
idea empirically (Quigg 1993). However, after the construction the land-value of a de-
veloped property is not zero. The bundle of rights and flexible real options associated 
with the indestructible urban land allow opportunities to redevelop and to change the 
usage. The value of the option to build for example regenerates with the depreciation or 
demolition of the building. The Following section describes the landlords possible real 
options associated with a house or flat on a build property. 
To demonstrate the real option characteristic of a property the right to build on a free lot 
is quite useful but most of the property is build. Therefore the next chapter provides an 
overview to the options of landlords with build properties. 
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3  The Real Options of Private House Owners 
As mentioned above we focus on landlords which are renters. Figure 2 shows the real 
options of a landlord with a flat or a house in a simple decision tree. The owner has to 
maximize the expected cash flow and he has to consider that present actions determine 
the options in the future. The scheme is not conclusively but it contains the most famous 
real options that have been frequently discussed in the literature. On the right side re-
generating real options might be added with ongoing time. 
Figure 2: 
Real Options of Private House Owners 
 
Source:  Author. 
3.1  Option to Refurbish or Expand the Building 
One of the owner´s real options is the refurbishment of the building. By upgrading to a 
higher quality segment higher rents can be realized. It can be seen as the option to acquire 














Time  T0  
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future, the value of this option goes up too. The option to expand is quite similar to the 
building option of a free lot. The investment cost for an additional storey or a better Qual-
ity of the flats are the price to gain the present value of the additional rent revenues. 
3.2  Option of Temporary Closedown and Reopening 
The option of temporary closedown allows mothballing a building to minimize its oper-
ating costs. If rents in the future are rising again the owner will restart the tenancy. The 
effects of this strategy are visible in East German cities, where windows and doors of 
many houses are bricked and the lines for water or electricity are disconnected. The 
value of the option lies in the possibility to bridge a time of low revenues. A project 
with this option would be more valuable than the same project without it. The fact that 
exercising this option maintains all other options in figure makes it very popular in bad 
performing housing markets like in East German towns (Weiß 2008b). 
3.3  Option to Demolish 
Demolishing a building reconstitutes the state of the property to a free lot. There are two 
possible scenarios as driving forces to demolish a building.  
1.  A new building on the same property is so profitable, that its return exceeds the 
demolition costs and the value of the current house. 
2.  High operating costs cause a negative cash flow and make the demolition rea-
sonable. 
In the first case the demolition is not a disinvestment, but part of the construction cost of 
the new building. In other words the option to demolish can be considered jointly with 
the option to redevelop the property. The sales value of the property after demolishing 
rises by the cost of demolishing.  
The second case is a real disinvestment and generally not very probable because of the 
existing option of temporary closedown. The cost of mothballing must be much higher 
than  the  cost  of  demolition.  Demolition  without  the  possibility  of  redevelopment  is 
mostly connected with a loss of potentially valuable assets. That means that demolition 
is not rational even with a subsidy that neutralizes the cost of demolition.  
3.4  The Selling Option 
This is the classical mode of disinvestment. With a sale the landlord is able to switch his 
capital to another asset whatever it will be. The sale of a property reveals the market 
value of a property. With the price that is paid for the property the owner acquires the 
intrinsic value and the premium, that is the value of the bundle of real options.  
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4  Effects of Subsidies on the Real Options 
The Options mentioned above exist generally with or without the subsidies by the “Stadt-
umbau”-program. But the concept of these options is helpful to show how subsidies as a 
change of institutional conditions will change the value of the property. It is remarkable, 
that for any of the presented real options exist an adequate subsidy. 
At first we will look at the demolition subsidy effect on company level. Since the demo-
lition subsidy should reduce housing oversupply, the redevelopment of the same prop-
erty after a subsidized demolition is generally not allowed. This means that demolition 
would not be rational as seen in Case 1 of Chapter 4.3. But a special group of housing 
companies that were affected by extremely high vacancy benefits additionally in a kind 
of demolition swap by a partial abatement of their inherited depths. In this case the 
demolition of one property may enhance the cost structure and overall performance of 
the company´s portfolio. Exercising the demolition option in is now rational because 
remaining properties of the company will be more valuable, due to lower costs, lower 
vacancy and perhaps higher rents. 
As discussed in 4.3 Case 2 claiming of demolishing grants without the possibility of 
quitting the debts is only rational if a new building or another profitable subsequent us-
age as parking or as a garden for adjacent property developments is imaginable. In this 
case the investor of the new development has to buy the property and to calculate the 
demolition costs and reduces his offer by the cost of demolition. If there is a demolition 
subsidy the investor has lower cost to prepare the property for a new building and the 
current owner will expect a higher price in case of sale. That means that the demolition 
subsidy increases the intrinsic value of the property.  
But the demolition grant does not only have this direct effect on the demolished property 
itself. The option to refurbish or to expand a building of other landlords in the town be-
comes more valuable by the demolition subsidy that may stabilize rent revenues by re-
ducing oversupply. But the effects on other landlords and on the value of their properties 
are indirect, uncertain, difficult to quantify and rather delayed. Therefore, the accom-
plishment or just the announcement of such measures lifts up the option value of the 
property 
This effect can be attributed as well to the improvement subsidies. These measures are 
basically dedicated to change the image of a neighbourhood and to stimulate demand for 
flats and in this area and finally to rise rents as well. These subsidies for improving the 
surrounding urban area, enhancement of infrastructure, new pavement or greening up 
public spaces are typically spend by the public authorities (Liebmann et al. 2007, p. 26).  
The landlords mostly do not have a lot of influence on the distribution of improvement 
and demolition subsidies. But from these urban renewal interventions evolve a rising-
value expectation. Figure 3 shows the modification of the property´s values schemati- 
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cally. It starts with a similar constellation like in Figure 1 which represents a depressive 
market after a crashed bubble. High vacancy and moderate rents allows a quite low earn-
ing rate (E). With fix construction costs (C) results an intrinsic value (I). The Difference 
between the current sales value and intrinsic value is the premium value of the property: 
V I=O  
With demolition and other urban renewal measures in the neighborhood, that may start 
at point t the situation changes. Landlords and investors may believe that the earning 
rate of his property will be one day as high as it once was before the market in his town 
crashed down.1 
Figure 3: 
Values of the Property with Urban Development Measures 
 
Source:  Author. 
This optimistic but fictive future earning rate is marked by E’. Due to the elusive effects 
of most the urban renewal measures the intrinsic value shows no short-term reaction. 
The fundamental market situation and the type of housing and the architectural and ur-
banistic surrounding stay equal in the short run. But with the rising-value expectation 
the owner requires a higher sales value. V’ must be at least as high as the owner’s expec-
tation of the future intrinsic value. The premium value under urban renewal conditions 
(O’ = V’ – I) is now very high compared to the situation without the urban renewal pro-
                                                 
1  In the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) this behaviour is known as disposition ef-
fect. Since present losses are more aggravating than future ones the owner does not realize the loss 
but waits and hopes for better times. 
Time  t 
≡  Earning Rate E 
 Sales Value V 












Construction Costs C 
‘               Urban renewal strategy 
      ≡ 
≡ 
≡ 
Option Value O 
Euro  
IWH  _________________________________________________________________ 
 
IWH-Diskussionspapiere 11/2009  16
gram. The demolition and the improvement subsidies on neighbouring properties and 
public space rise up the revenue expectations which blow up the option value of the 
property.  
The option of temporary closedown or mothballing a house is promoted by a subsidy to 
preserve vacant historic buildings for houses that are of urbanistic interest. The subsidy 
helps to lower the one-time cost to close down the building and that raises primarily the 
intrinsic value of the property itself. The subsidy offers this option to a wider number of 
properties. It makes it easier to maintain the total value of the property including the 
other real options. To wait and to speculate for higher revenues in the future is cheaper 
and that may bolster the property values too. 
It is presumed that intensive urban renewal activities in East Germany leads to a kind of 
overvaluation of properties compared to the West German market. 
The next chapter presents a method to assess the valuation of property real options by 
comparing between the fundamental values of a property and its market value.   
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5  Assessing Real Options in the Housing Market 
The techniques to assess the value of real option have been developed mostly on the ba-
sis of approaches to assess the value of stock options. The valuation formula developed 
by Black and Scholes for financial options is only transferable to real options if volatil-
ity and values of the underlying assets are observable or specified by discounted cash 
flows and scenario analysis. Therewith it is possible to calculate the value of single real 
options by analyzing decision trees or with a binomial approach (Brealy et al 2008,  
pp. 619 et sep.). 
Quigg (1993) applies a method to measure the value of the option to wait with construc-
tion of free lots. A comparison group build lots is used to generate intrinsic values of 
fictive buildings on the free lots. Compared with the observable market values she com-
putes the value of the option. 
Since the bundle of housing market real options that is documented in Chapter 3 is 
linked to the presumption of an existing real estate bubble, I will adapt an assessment 
approach by Kanoh and Murase (1999). Their model is aimed at the explanation of the 
real estate bubble in Japan in the end of the 1980s and its burst in the 1990s. Real option 
approach indicates that the option value can be derived as a difference between market 
value and the fundamental value. The calculation of the fundamental value by a divi-
dend discount model serves as an approximation of the intrinsic value: 
Vf ≡ Vi  (1) 
The principle of the dividend discount model (DDM) is a method of stock assessment 
and goes back to a study by Williams (1938). It targets to find a fair value without any 
speculative components. Therefore the value of a stock corresponds to the actual present 
value of the expected dividends which is replaced by rents in the case of real estate. The 
dividend rather the rent may have an assumed self financing growth rate like in the 
model of Gordon (1959) but if growth is uncertain Corporate Finance provides the Pre-
sent Value of Growth Opportunities (PVGO). This concept divides the value of the en-
terprise into a component free of growth and the value of the growth options (Brealey et 
al. 2008, 106f). This is not far of reality because the value of land usually does not grow 
constantly by reinvesting profits, but by environmental events and processes. 
Assuming durable capital and continuous rent payments, the fundamental value results 
from the net present value of perpetuity which is the constant rent divided by the interest 
rate i: 
Vf = R/i.  (2) 
The present Value of growth opportunities, which is the option value Vo in the world of 
real option theory, results from the observable market value.  
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In the context of the property real options the rent can be seen as the dividend of hous-
ing. But to adopt the concept to find the intrinsic value some specific adjustments are 
made. 
Indeed, rents are revenues of the investor, but they pay not only for the invested com-
pany capital, but must also cover the operating expenses of real estate. Therefore only 
the effective earning E of the landlord should be used for the intrinsic value.  
The operating expenses are repair costs, maintenance costs and if necessary administra-
tive costs as well as legal costs. The maintenance reserve is calculated by a rule of 
thumb called Petersche Formula (Bogenstätter 2008, p. 205). The empirically founded 
says that within an 80 years lifecycle of a building the total maintenance costs (CM) sum 
up 1.5 fold the pure construction cost (C) of the building without nonrecurring expenses 
for property and land preparation:  
CM per year =(C*1.5) / 80  (4) 
Furthermore the landlord bears the risk of vacancy. Therefore the nominal rent is re-
duced by the vacancy rate vj in each city j.  
The calculation of the intrinsic value Vi for rentable residential real estates in city j 
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  (5) 
The option value can be calculated by replacing 
i
R j  in Equation 3 by Equation 5.  
Strictly speaking the option value resulting from this algorithm should be interpreted as 
the sum of the present value of growth options of the build flat and proportional value of 
the property´s land. 
Rents and housing prices for the year 2005 are taken from the Empirica (A) property 
price database. Rents are reported as median values in Euro per sqm for flats between 70 
and 90 sqm. Prices are reported as median values in Euro per sqm for flats and condo-
miniums in apartment houses except the new build first sale flats. Vacancy rates are 
published by Empirica (B) and the average building costs that are used in the calculation 
of the maintenance reserve are delivered by the german federal bureau of statistics (Sta-
tistisches Bundesamt). As discount rate serve the mean of the long term mortgage inter-
est rate between 2004 and 2005. The interest rates are quarterly published by the federal 
bank of Germany (Deutsche Bundesbank).  
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6  Empirical Results 
Due to the restricted availability of time series data of vacancy rates the empirical as-
sessment is focused on the year 2005. Therefore the presented findings should be seen 
as an intermediary result. The sample consists of 92 of the 116 independent cities where 
consistent and reliable data on rents and vacancy was available. The sample includes 16 
East German cities. Table 1 list up descriptive statistics of the variables and results of 
Formula 4. The average nominal option value of build properties is about one third of 
the average flat´s market value.  
Table 1: 
Assessment of the real option – descriptive results 
Variable   Mean  St. Dev.  Min.  Max. 
Monthly Net rent per sqm 2005 (r) 
  5.91  1.20  3.87  10.36 
Market value of flats per sqm 2005 (Vm) 
  1500.38  367.96  714.00  2920.00 
Earnings per sqm (E)
  46.25  14.60  20.04  95.17 
Intrinsic value per sqm (Vi)
   993.24  313.66  430.46  2043.87 
Nominal Option Value per sqm (Vo = Vm –Vf)
  507.14  177.61  68.97  939.58 
Source:  Calculation by the IWH. Data by Empirica (A, B), Statistisches Bundesamt, Deutsche Bundes-
bank. 
Comparing the values for East and West Germany reveals quite interesting differences. 
The option value in East Germany Value is at average 565.7 Euro, while the average 
Option in West Germany is only 494.8. The difference is not significant. But a compari-
son of nominal option values is not proper because each nominal option value is esti-
mated with an individual regional market price. The option ratio Vo/Vi is a better meas-
ure to evaluate the existence of a regional bubble because of the normalization. Related 
to the intrinsic value the Option ratio of 68.5% is significantly higher in the East than in 
the West with only 52.9 % (Table 2). 
Table 2: 
East- West Comparison of Option values 
  East 
n = 16 
West 




Nominal Option Value (Vo = Vm –Vf)  565,71  494,80  0,187 
Option Ratio in % (Vo/Vi*100)  68.54  52.86  0,038 
Source:  Calculation by the IWH. Data by Empirica (A, B), Statistisches Bundesamt, Deutsche Bundes-
bank.  
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Remember that urban renewal spending is much higher in East that in West Germany. 
Therefore it is likely that the high level of option values in East Germany is caused more 
by the regional allocation of the subsidies than simply by location. Unfortunately the 
strong  and  highly  significant  correlation  between  the  urban  renewal  spending 
(URB_REN) and the East-West Dummy (EAST) makes it difficult to identify the influ-
ence of both variables together. Table 3 show the results of the correlation of Option Ra-
tio (Vo/Vi). The correlation analysis indicates clearly that urban renewal spending con-
tributes to high option values and might be responsible for the above average option 
values in East Germany. 
Table 3: 
Correlations (Spearman Rho) of the Option Ratio  
  URB_REN  EAST=1 








2-side significance in brackets. Sample of 92 cities; 16 in East Germany 76 in West Germany. 
Source:  Calculation by the IWH. Data by Empirica (A,B), Statistisches Bundesamt, Deutsche Bundes-
bank, INKAR. 
Nevertheless, there is no doubt that a more detailed statistical model is required to find 
out a good estimate for the Urban Renewal influence on the Option value.   
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7.  Conclusion  
The empirical results provide some evidence for the hypothesis that massive provision 
of money for urban renewal in East Germany leads to a stabilization and prolongation of 
the real estate bubble that has emerged in the 1990s. This policy is good for housing 
companies, landlords and their financing banks that are interested in worthy collateral. 
But landlords and investors in East Germany should not forget that this situation might 
be very fragile and instable. A recent evaluation study on the Urban redesign program 
recognizes  that  an  actual  consolidation  of  the  flat  market  is  not  to  be  ascertained 
(Aehnelt 2008, p. 341). Vacancy rates have not decreased permanently, the sales rate of 
houses is still very low and many buildings are abandoned. Given the assumptions and 
considerations of the real option approach, the urban renewal measures have potential to 
block up an economic change in the real estate market. This is a policy implication that 
is mentioned already by Titman (1995) and has been discussed in Weiß (2008b) for East 
Germany. Therefore the poor outcome of the program regarding the investment stimulus 
is not surprising. High option values are on the one hand a hurdle for new investors, be-
cause returns of investment are very low, or even negative. The current owners on the 
other hand have no incentive to change current apartment building structures into mod-
ern and attractive homes because they hope that the urban renewal activities will turn 
around the market. 
Neglecting these considerations the official program evaluation, that will be the basis for 
political  decisions,  recommends  the  continuation  of  the  program  at  least  until  2016 
(Aehnelt 2008, p. 317).  
To prevent the latent crash of real estate values with dramatic equity losses for landlords 
and banks this policy could be the lesser evil. But the continuous distortion of the hous-
ing market may have consequences for homebuyers, tenants and the construction indus-
try. Since these transaction costs of the program are still unknown, it is hardly to say 
whether a burst of the option driven bubble would be worse or better. But one is clear: 
as long the bubble is alive there is the danger of burst. And it is generally not very 
healthy if price relations of a market are dominated by subsidies. An upcoming study on 
the temporal development of real option values should examine indicators for a slowly 
controlled collapse of the bubble. Furthermore it would be interesting to model the ef-
fects of fading out the above average urban renewal spending for East Germany.   
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